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ABSTRACT
Recently, adversarial attacks can be applied to the physical
world, causing practical issues to various Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) powered applications. Most existing physi-
cal adversarial attack defense works only focus on eliminating
explicit perturbation patterns from inputs, ignoring interpre-
tation to CNN’s intrinsic vulnerability. Therefore, they lack
expected versatility to different attacks and thereby depend
on considerable data processing costs. In this paper, we pro-
pose LanCe – a comprehensive and lightweight CNN defense
methodology against different physical adversarial attacks. By
interpreting CNN’s vulnerability, we find that non-semantic
adversarial perturbations can activate CNN with significantly
abnormal activations and even overwhelm other semantic in-
put patterns’ activations. We improve the CNN recognition
process by adding a self-verification stage to detect the po-
tential adversarial input with only one CNN inference cost.
Based on the detection result, we further propose a data re-
covery methodology to defend the physical adversarial attacks.
We apply such defense methodology into both image and au-
dio CNN recognition scenarios and analyze the computational
complexity for each scenario, respectively. Experiments show
that our methodology can achieve an average 91% successful
rate for attack detection and 89% accuracy recovery. More-
over, it is at most 3× faster compared with the state-of-the-art
defense methods, making it feasible to resource-constrained
embedded systems, such as mobile devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) powered applications are facing a critical challenge
– adversarial attacks. By injecting particular perturbations into
input data, adversarial attacks can mislead CNN recognition
results. With aggressive methods proposed, adversarial per-
turbations can be concentrated into a small area and attached
to the real objects, which easily threaten the CNN recognition
systems in the physical world. The left side of Fig. 1 shows
a physical adversarial example on the traffic sign detection.
When attaching a well-crafted adversarial patch on the orig-
inal stop sign, the traffic sign detection system will be misled
to a wrong recognition result as a speed limit sign.
Many works have been proposed to defend against physical
adversarial attacks [1–4]. However, most of them neglected
CNN’s intrinsic vulnerability interpretations. Instead, either
they merely focused on eliminating explicit perturbation pat-
terns from input [2], or they simply adopted multiple CNNs
to conduct the cross-verification [3, 4]. All these methods
have certain drawbacks: They failed to find a common defense
methodology, lacking versatility for preventing different phys-
ical adversarial attacks. Moreover, they introduced consider-
able data processing costs during perturbations elimination,
which significantly increased methods’ computation costs.
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Fig. 1.: Physical Adversarial Attack for Traffic Sign
In this paper, we propose LanCe, a comprehensive and
lightweight defense methodology against different physical ad-
versarial attacks. By interpreting CNN’s vulnerability, we re-
veal that the CNN decision-making process lacks necessary
qualitative semantics distinguishing ability: the non-semantic
input patterns can significantly activate CNN and overwhelm
other semantic input patterns. Leveraging the adversarial at-
tacks’ characteristic inconsistencies, we improve the CNN
recognition process by adding a self-verification stage. Fig. 1
illustrates the self-verification stage for a traffic sign adversar-
ial attack. For each input image, after one CNN inference, the
verification stage will locate the significant activation sources
(green circle) and calculate the input semantic inconsistency
with the expected semantic patterns (right circle) according to
the prediction result. Once the inconsistency exceeds a pre-
defined threshold, CNN will conduct a data recovery process
to recover the input image. Our defense methodology has min-
imum computation components involved, which can be ex-
tended to CNN based image and audio recognition scenarios.
Specifically, we have following contributions in this work:
• By interpreting CNN’s vulnerability, we identify charac-
teristic inconsistencies between the physical adversarial
attack and the natural input recognition.
• We propose a self-verification stage to detect the abnor-
mal activation patterns’ semantics with only one CNN in-
ference involved.
• We further propose a data recovery methodology to re-
cover both attacked image and audio input data. More-
over, we apply such detection and data recovery method-
ology into image and audio scenarios.
• In each scenario, we quantitatively analyze our defense
process’s computational complexity, and guarantee the
lightweight computation cost.
Experiments show that our method can achieve an aver-
age 90% detection successful rate and average 81% accuracy
recovery for image physical adversarial attacks. Also, our
method achieves 92% detection successful rate and 77.5% ac-
curacy recovery for audio adversarial attacks. Moreover, our
method is at most 3× faster than the state-of-the-art defense
methods, which is feasible to various resource-constrained em-
bedded systems, such as mobile devices.
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Attack Process
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
A. Physical Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks started to arouse researchers’ general
concern with adversarial examples, which were first introduced
by [5]. Recently, adversarial attack approaches were also
brought from the algorithm domain into the physical world,
which are referred as the physical adversarial attack. [6] first
leveraged a masking method to concentrate the adversarial per-
turbations into a small area and implement the attack on real
traffic signs with taped graffiti. [7] extended the scope of phys-
ical attacks with adversarial patches. With more aggressive
patterns than graffiti, these patches can be attached to physical
objects arbitrarily and have strong model transferability.
Beyond aforementioned image cases, some physical adver-
sarial attacks also have been proposed to audios. Yakura et
al. [8] proposed an audio physical adversarial attack that can
still be effective after playback and recording in the physical
world. [9] generated audio adversarial commands in a normal
song which can be played through the air.
Compared to noise based adversarial attacks, physical ad-
versarial attacks reduce the attack difficulty and further impair
the practicality and reliability of deep learning technologies.
B. Image physical Adversarial Attack Defense
There are several works have been proposed to defense such
physical adversarial attacks in the image recognition process.
Naseer et al. proposed a local gradients smoothing scheme
against physical adversarial attacks [2]. By regularizing gra-
dients in the estimated noisy region before feeding images
into CNN inference, their method can eliminate the poten-
tial impacts from adversarial attacks. Hayes et al. proposed
a physical image adversarial attack defense method based on
image inpainting [1]. Based on the traditional image process-
ing methods, they detect the localization of adversarial noises
in the input image and further leverage the image inpainting
technology to remove the adversarial noises.
Although these methods are effective for image physical ad-
versarial attacks defense, they still have certain disadvantages
regarding versatility and computation. These methods are de-
signed for solving specific adversarial attack which are not
integrated for different physical adversarial attack situations.
Moreover, they will introduce huge computation costs.
C. Audio Physical Adversarial Attack Defense
Compared with images, the audio data requires more pro-
cessing efforts for recognition. Fig. 2 shows a typical audio
recognition process and the corresponding physical adversarial
attack. The audio waveform is first extracted as Mel-frequency
Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) features. Then we leverage a
CNN to achieve acoustic feature recognition, which can ob-
tain the candidate phonemes. Finally, a lexicon and language
model is applied to obtain the recognition result ”open”. When
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Fig. 3.: Visualized Neuron’s Input Pattern by Activation
Maximization Visualization
the adversarial noise is injected to the original input waveform,
the final recognition result is misled to ”close”.
Several works have been proposed to detect and defend such
adversarial attacks [3, 4, 10]. Zeng et al. leveraged multi-
ple Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems to detect
audio physical adversarial attack based on a cross-verification
methodology [4]. However, their method lacks certain versa-
tility which cannot detect the adversarial attacks with model
transferability. Yang et al. proposed an audio adversarial at-
tack detection and defense method by exploring the temporal
dependency in audio adversarial attacks [3]. However, their
method requires multiple CNN recognition inferences which
is time-consuming.
III. INTERPRETATION ORIENTED PHYSICAL
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE
In this section, we first interpret the CNN vulnerability by
analyzing input patterns’ semantics with the activation maxi-
mization visualization [11]. Based on semantics analysis, we
identify the adversarial attack patches as non-semantic input
patterns with abnormal distinguished activations. Specifically,
to evaluate the semantics, we propose metrics that can mea-
sure inconsistencies between the local input patterns that cause
the distinguished activations and the synthesized patterns with
expected semantics. Based on the inconsistency analysis, we
further propose a lightweight defense methodology consists of
the self-verification and the data recovery.
A. CNN Vulnerability Interpretation
Interpretation and Assumption: In a typical image or audio
recognition process, CNN extracts features from the original
input data and gradually derive a prediction result. However,
when injecting physical adversarial perturbations into the orig-
inal data, CNN will be misled to a wrong prediction result. To
better interpret the vulnerability, we major focus on a typical
image physical adversarial attack – adversarial patch attack as
an example. In Fig. 1, by comparing with the original input,
we find that an adversarial patch usually has no constraints in
color/shape, etc. Such patches usually sacrifice the semantic
structures so as to cause significant abnormal activations and
overwhelm the other input patterns’ activations. Therefore, we
make an assumption that CNN lacks qualitative semantics dis-
tinguishing ability which can be activated by the non-semantic
adversarial patch during CNN inference.
Assumption Verification: According to our assumption, the
non-semantic input patterns will lead to abnormal activations
while the semantic input patterns generate normal activations.
We can evaluate this difference by investigating the semantic
of each neuron in CNN. Therefore, we adopt a visualized CNN
semantic analysis method – Activation Maximization Visual-
ization (AM) [11]. AM can generate a pattern to visualize
each neuron’s most activated semantic input. The generation
process of pattern V (N li ) can be considered as synthesizing an
input image to a CNN model that delicately maximizes the ac-
tivation of the ith neuron N li in the layer of l. Specifically, this
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Fig. 4.: Image Adversarial Patch Attack
process can be formulated as:
V (N li ) = arg max
X
Ali(X), X ← X+η·∂A
l
i(X)
∂X
(1)
where, Ali(X) is the activation of N
l
i from an input image X,
η is the gradient ascent step size.
Fig. 3 shows the visualized semantic input patterns by us-
ing AM. As the original AM method is designed for se-
mantics interpretation, many feature regulations and hand-
engineered natural image references are involved in generat-
ing interpretable visualization patterns. Therefore we can get
three AM patterns with an average activation magnitude value
of 3.5 in Fig. 3 (a). The objects in the three patterns indicate
they have clear semantics. However, when we remove these
semantics regulations in the AM process, we obtain three dif-
ferent visualized patterns as shown in Fig. 3 (b). We can find
that these three patterns are non-semantic, but they have sig-
nificant abnormal activations with an average magnitude value
of 110. This phenomenon can prove our assumption that CNN
neurons lack semantics distinguishing ability and can be sig-
nificantly activated by non-semantic inputs patterns.
B. Inconsistency Metrics for Input Semantic
and Prediction Activation
Inconsistency Identification: To identify the non-semantic
input patterns for the attack detection, we examine its impacts
during CNN inference by comparing the natural image recog-
nition with the physical adversarial attacks.
Fig. 4 shows a typical adversarial patch based physical at-
tack. The patterns in the left circles are the primary activation
sources from the input images, and the bars on the right are
the neurons’ activations in the last convolutional layer. From
input patterns, we identify a significant difference between the
adversarial patch and primary activation source on the origi-
nal image, which is referred as Input Semantic Inconsistency.
From the aspect of prediction activation magnitudes, we ob-
serve another difference between the adversarial input and the
original input, namely Prediction Activation Inconsistency.
Inconsistency Metrics Formulation: We further define two
metrics to indicate above two inconsistencies’ degrees.
1) Input Semantic Inconsistency Metric: This metric
measures the input semantic inconsistency between the non-
semantic adversarial patches and the semantic local input pat-
terns from the natural image. It can be defined as follows:
D(Ppra,Pori)=1−S(Ppra,Pori),Ppra <←−Φ:Ali(p),Pori <←−Φ:Ali(o), (2)
where Ppra and Pori represent the input patterns from the ad-
versarial input and the original input. Φ : Ali(p) and Φ : A
l
i(o)
represent the set of neurons’ activations produced by the ad-
versarial patch and the original input, respectively. < maps
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Fig. 5.: The Results after 2D Fast Fourier Transform
neurons’ activations to the primary local input patterns. S rep-
resents a similarity metric.
2) Prediction Activation Inconsistency Metric: The second
inconsistency is on the activation level, which reveals the ac-
tivations’ magnitude distribution inconsistency in the last con-
volutional layer between the adversarial input and the original
input. We also use a similar metric to measure it as follows:
D(fpra,fori)=1−S(fpra,fori),fpra∼Φ:Ali(p),fori∼Φ:Ali(o), (3)
where fpra and Iori represent the magnitude distribution of
activations in the last convolutional layer generated by the ad-
versarial input and the original input data.
For the above two inconsistency metrics, we can easily ob-
tain Ppra and fpra since they come from the input data. How-
ever, Pori and fori are not easily to get because of the variety
of the natural input data. Therefore, we need to synthesize the
standard input data which can provide the semantic input pat-
terns and activation magnitude distribution. The synthesized
input data for each prediction class can be obtained from a
standard dataset. By feeding CNN with a certain number of
input from the standard dataset, we can record the average
activation magnitude distribution in last convolutional layer.
Moreover, we can locate the primary semantic input patterns
for each prediction class.
C. Physical Adversarial Attack Defense based on
CNN Self-Verification and Data Recovery
The proposed two inconsistencies demonstrate the differ-
ence between physical adversarial attacks and natural im-
age recognition w.r.t input patterns and prediction activations.
By utilizing the inconsistency metrics, we propose a defense
methodology which consists of a self-verification and a data
recovery in the CNN decision-making process. Specifically,
the entire methodology flow is described as following:
Self-Verification: (1) We first feed the input into the CNN
inference and obtain the prediction class. (2) Next, CNN can
locate the primary activation sources from the practical input
and obtain the activations in the last convolutional layer. (3)
Then CNN leverages the proposed metrics to measure the two
inconsistencies between the practical input and the synthesized
data with the prediction class. (4) Once any inconsistency ex-
ceeds the given threshold, CNN will consider the input as an
adversarial input.
Data Recovery: (5) After a physical adversarial attack has
been detected by the self-verification stage, the data recovery
methodology is further applied to recover the input data which
has been attacked. Specifically, we leverage image inpainting
and activation denoising to recover the input image and audio.
We will derive two methods from such methodology for im-
age and audio scenarios in Section 4 and Section 5.
Computational Complexity: As aforementioned, the com-
putation cost is critical to the adversarial defense approaches.
Therefore, we leverage computational complexity to evalu-
ate the methodology’s total computation cost. A low compu-
tational complexity indicates a small computation workload,
proving the proposed methodology is lightweight. In our de-
fense methodology, the computational complexity is mainly
contributed by the inner steps such as the CNN inference, in-
consistency metrics calculation and data recovery. In follow-
ing two scenarios, we will specifically analyze the computation
complexity for each of above steps.
IV. DEFENSE AGAINST IMAGE PHYSICAL
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
In this section, we will specifically describe our defense
methodology against image physical adversarial attacks.
A. Defense Process in the Image Scenario
Primary Activation Pattern Localization: For the image
physical adversarial attacks defense, we mainly depend on the
input semantic inconsistency in input pattern level. Therefore,
we need to locate the primary activation source from the input
image by adopting a CNN activation visualization method –
Class Activation Mapping (CAM) [12]. Let Ak(x, y) denotes
the value of the kth activation in the last convolutional layer at
spatial location (x, y). We can compute a sum of all activations
at the spatial location (x, y) in the last convolutional layer as:
AT (x, y) =
1∑
K
Ak(x, y), (4)
where K is the total number of activations in the last convo-
lutional layer. The larger value of AT (x, y) indicates the ac-
tivation source in the input image at the corresponding spatial
location (x, y) is more important for classification result.
Inconsistency Derivation: According to our preliminary
analysis, the input adversarial patch contains much more high-
frequency information than the natural semantic input patterns.
Therefore, we convert the patterns with a series of transforma-
tions which are shown in Fig. 5. After the 2D Fast Fourier
Transform (2D-FFT) transformation and binary conversion,
we can observe the significant difference between adversarial
input and semantic synthesized input. Therefore, we replace
S(Ipra, Iori) with Jaccard Similarity Coefficient (JSC) [13]
and propose our image inconsistency metric as:
D(Ppra,Pexp)=1−JSC(Ppra,Pexp)=|Ppra
⋃
Pexp|−|Ppra⋂Pexp|
|Ppra⋃Pexp| , (5)
where Iexp is the synthesized semantic pattern with predicted
class. Ppra
⋂
Pexp means the numbers of pixels where the
pixel value of Ppra and Pexp both equal to 1.
With the above inconsistency metric, we propose our spe-
cific defense methodology which contains self-verification and
image recovery. The entire process is described in Fig. 6.
Self-Verification for Detection: For each input image, we
apply CAM to locate the source location of the biggest model
activations. Then we crop the image to obtain patterns with
maximum activations. During semantic test, we calculate the
inconsistency between Ipra and Iexp. If it is higher than a pre-
defined threshold, we consider an adversarial input detected.
Data Recovery for Image: After the patch is detected,
we conduct the image data recovery by directly removing
patch from the original input data. In our case, to ensure the
lightweight computation workload, we leverage Neighbor In-
terpolation, a simple but effective image inpainting technology
to repair the image and eliminate the attack effects. Concretely,
each pixel in the adversarial patch will be replace by the aver-
age value of its eight surrounding pixels. After the interpo-
lation, we feed back the recovery image into CNN to do the
prediction again. With above steps, we can defend an image
physical adversarial attack during CNN inference.
B. Computational Complexity Analysis
The total computation complexity of the defense process in
the image scenario is contributed by following four steps: the
CNN inference, the maximum activation pattern locating, the
inconsistency metric calculation and the image interpolation.
We model each step’s computational complexity as following:
CNN Inference: When the input image is first fed into CNN
for class prediction, the inference computational complexity
CC is formulated as:
CC ∼ O(
L∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
rji
2
ni−1h
j
iw
j
i ), (6)
where rji
2
represents jth filter’s kernel size in ith layer, hjiw
j
i
denotes the corresponding size of output feature map, L is the
total layer number and ni is the filter numbers in ith layer.
Primary Activation Pattern Localization: Since computa-
tion complexities of other operations such as cropping are neg-
ligible, we consider CAM contributes the primary computa-
tional complexity in this step. In CAM, each spatial location
(x, y) in the last convolutional layer is the weighted sum of
K activations. Therefore, the total computational complexity
is: CM ∼ O(KhnLL wnLL ), where hnLL wnLL is the size of the
feature map in last convolutional layer.
Inconsistency Metric Derivation: This step consists of 2D-
FFT calculation and JSC calculation. According to the analysis
in [14, 15], the computational complexities of above two pro-
cesses can be approximate to CF ∼ O(NlogN) and CJ ∼
O(nalogna), where N and na represent N pixel number in
input image and maximum activation pattern, respectively.
Image Interpolation: For each pixel, the total operation
number during interpolation is nine (eight adding operation
and one dividing operation). Therefore, the total interpola-
tion computation complexity for the entire adversarial patch
is CL ∼ O(9na).
Comparing with the last three steps, the computational com-
plexity of CNN inference dominates the entire computational
complexity of our defense methodology in the image scenario.
Since our methodology only involves one CNN inference, it
usually has less computation cost than other methods.
Case Study: To examine the lightweight of our method,
we use VGG-16 [19] with 224×224 input image as an exam-
ple. According to the built models, the total computation com-
plexity of our defense method is approximate to O(15300M)
FLOPs (Floating Point Operations) while [2] is approximate
(1) Input
(2) CAM
(3) Patch Localization 
and Crop
(4) 
Semantic 
Test
…
Synthesized 
Patterns
(5) Image 
Recovery
Image 
Inpainting
(6) Feed Back 
into CNN
For prediction
“Bird”
Fig. 6.: Adversarial Patch Attack Defense
to O(18300M). Our method’s superiority in terms of compu-
tational complexity will be further verified by evaluating the
process time cost in Section 6.
V. DEFENSE AGAINST AUDIO PHYSICAL
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
In this section, we will introduce the detailed defense design
flow for the audio physical adversarial attacks.
A. Defense Process in the Audio Scenario
Inconsistency Derivation: Different from images, the audio
data requires more processing efforts. As Fig. 2 shows, during
the audio recognition, the input waveform needs to pass Mel-
frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) conversion to be trans-
ferred from the time domain into the time-frequency domain.
In that case, the original input audio data will loss semantics
after the MFCC conversion. Therefore, we leverage the pre-
diction activation inconsistency to detect the audio physical
adversarial attacks.
More specifically, we measure the activation magnitude dis-
tribution inconsistency between the practical input and the syn-
thesized data with the same prediction class. We adopt a pop-
ular similarity evaluation method - Pearson Correlation Coef-
ficient (PCC) [16] and the inconsistency metric is defined as:
D(fpra,fexp)=1−PCC(fpra,fexp)=1−E[(fpra−µpra)(fexp−µexp)]
σpraσexp
,
(7)
where Ipra and Iexp represent the activations in the last con-
volutional layer for both practical input and synthesized input.
µa and µo denote mean values of fpre and fexp, σpra and σexp
are standard derivations, and E means the overall expectation.
Self-Verification for Detection: With established inconsis-
tency metric, we further apply self-verification stage to CNN
for the audio physical adversarial attack. The detection flow is
described as following: We first obtain activations in the last
convolutional layer for every possible input word by testing
CNN with a standard dataset. Then we calculate the inconsis-
tency value D(Ipra, Iexp). If the model is attacked by the au-
dio adversarial attack, D(Ipra, Iexp) will exceed a pre-defined
threshold. According to our preliminary experiments tested
with various attacks, D(Ipra, Iexp) of an adversarial input is
usually larger than 0.18 while a natural input’s D(Ipra, Iexp)
is usually smaller than 0.1. Therefore, there exists a large range
for the threshold to distinguish the natural and the adversarial
input audios, which can benefit our accurate detection.
Data Recovery for Audio: After identifying the adversar-
ial input audio, simply denying it can cause undesired conse-
quences. Therefore, attacked audio recovery is considered as
one of the most acceptable solutions. We propose a new solu-
tion - “activation denoising” as our defense method, which tar-
gets ablating adversarial effects from the activation level. The
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Fig. 7.: Audio Adversarial Attack Defense
activation denoising takes advantages of the aforementioned
last layer activation patterns, which have stable correlations
with determined predication labels.
Our adversarial audio recovery method is shown in Fig. 7:
Based on detection results, we can identify the wrong predic-
tion label, and obtain the standard activation patterns of the
wrong class in the last layer. (For the best performance, we
locate the top-k activation index.) Then we can find the acti-
vations with the same index. These activations are most po-
tentially caused by the adversarial noises and supersede the
original activations. Therefore, we suppress these activations
to resurrect original ones.
B. Computational Complexity Analysis
The computational complexity in the audio scenario is
mainly determined by the CNN inference and the inconsis-
tency metric calculation, since other steps directly manipulate
limited activation values with negligible computation work-
load involved. Therefore, we model the computational com-
plexity as following:
CNN Inference: Since the audio has same inference pro-
cess in CNN, we can use the same model in image scenario to
measure the computation complexity in the audio scenario.
Inconsistency Metric Derivation: The computation com-
plexity of this step is contributed by the PCC calculation,
which can be formulated as CP ∼ O(nL2), where nL is the
activation number in the last layer.
Case Study: We also leverage a case study to specifically
demonstrate that our proposed methodology is lightweight
comparing with others in the audio scenario. The CNN
model is Command Classification model [17] with 1s audio
input (16000 sample rate). Therefore, the total computation
complexity of our methodology is approximate to O(500M)
FLOPs (Float Point Operations). However, the computa-
tion complexities of other two state-of-the-art audio defense
methods are around O(1100M) and O(1600M). There-
fore, our proposed methodology is more friendly to resource-
constrained mobile devices.
VI. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate LanCe in terms of effectiveness
and efficiency for image and audio physical adversarial attacks.
A. Defense Evaluation for Image Scenario
Experiment Setup: Our detection method is mainly evalu-
ated for adversarial patch attacks. The adversarial patches are
generated by using Inception-V3 [18] as the base model. The
generated patch with high transferability are utilized to attack
other two models: VGG-16 [19] and ResNet-18 [20]. Then we
apply our defense method on all three models and test their de-
tection and recovery success rates. Meanwhile, we also record
TABLE I
: Image Adversarial Patch Attack Defense Evaluation
Stage Inception-V3 VGG-16 ResNe-18tPM* LanCe PM* LanCe PM* LanCe
Detection
Detection
Succ.Rate 88% 91% 89% 90% 85% 89%
Recovery
Original
Acc. 9.8% 9.8% 9.5% 9.8% 10.8% 9.8%
Recovery
Acc. 88% 90% 89.3% 91.5% 90% 91%
Time 233ms 192ms 315ms 243ms 461ms 318ms
*:Patch Masking (PM) [1]
TABLE II
: Audio Adversarial Attack Data Recovery Evaluation
Method FGSM BIM CW Genetic Time Cost
No Recovery 10% 5% 4% 13% NA
Dependency
Detection [3] 85% 83% 80% 80% 1813ms
Noise Flooding [10] 62% 65% 62% 59% 1246ms
LanCe 87% 88% 85% 83% 521ms
the time cost of defense methods to demonstrate the efficiency
of LanCe. The baseline methods is Patch Masking, which is
one state-of-the-art defense method [1]. And the threshold for
inconsistency is set as 0.46.
Defense Effectiveness: Table I shows the overall detection
and image recovery performance. On all three models, LanCe
consistently shows higher detection success rate than [1]. The
further proposed image recovery could help to correct predic-
tions, resulting in 80.3%∼82% accuracy recovery improve-
ment on different models while Patch Masking only achieves
78.2%∼79.5% accuracy recovery improvement.
Time Cost: We leverage the process time cost to represent
the method’s computational complexity. We can find that the
process time cost of our defense method for one physical ad-
versarial attack is from 67ms∼71ms while the Patch Masking
is from 132ms∼153ms.
By the above comparison, we show that our defense method
has better defense performance than Patch Masking with re-
spect to both effectiveness and efficiency.
B. Defense Evaluation for Audio Scenario
Experiment Setup: For audio scenario, we use Com-
mand Classification Model [17] on Google Voice Command
dataset [17]. The inconsistency threshold for adversarial de-
tection is obtained by the grid search and set as 0.11 in this
experiment. For comparison, we re-implement another two
state-of-the-art defense methods: Dependency Detection [3]
and Multiversion [4]. Four methods [5, 21–23] are used as at-
tacking methods to prove the generality of our defense method.
Fig. 8 shows the overall performance comparison.
Defense Effectiveness: LanCe can always achieve more
than 92% detection success rate for all audio physical adversar-
ial attacks. By contrast, Dependency Detection achieves 89%
detection success rate in average while Multiversion Detection
only have average 74%. Therefore, LanCe demonstrates the
best detection accuracy. Then we evaluate LanCe’s recovery
performance. The k value in the top-k index is set as 6. Since
Multiversion [4] cannot be used to recovery, we re-implement
another method, Noise Flooding [10] as comparison. And we
use the original vulnerable model without data recovery as the
baseline. Table I shows the overall audio recovery performance
evaluation. After applying our recovery method, the prediction
accuracy significantly increase from average 8% to average
85.8%, which is 77.8% accuracy recovery. Both Dependency
Detection and Noise Flooding have lower accuracy recovery
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Fig. 8.: Audio Adversarial Attack Detection Performance
rate, which are 74% and 54%, respectively.
Time Cost: For defense efficiency, the computational com-
plexity of LanCe is much lower than other methods according
to our previous analysis. As the result, the time cost of our
method is 521ms while other two methods usually cost more
than 1540ms for a single physical adversarial attack. Thus, our
defense method is 2∼3× faster than other two methods.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a CNN defense methodology for
physical adversarial attacks for both image and audio recog-
nition applications. Leveraging the comprehensive CNN vul-
nerability analysis and two novel CNN inconsistency metrics,
our method can effectively and efficiently detect and elimi-
nate the image and audio physical adversarial attacks. Experi-
ments show that our methodology can achieve an average 91%
successful rate for attack detection and 89% accuracy recov-
ery. Moreover, the proposed defense methods are at most 3×
faster compared to the state-of-the-art defense methods, mak-
ing them feasible to resource-constrained embedded systems,
such as mobile devices.
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